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<title>Law and Tech Research feed - Mulligan</title>
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    <title>New Governance, Chief Privacy Officers, and the Corporate Management of Information Privacy in the United States: An Initial Inquiry</title>
    <description><![CDATA[
        While the turn from traditional regulation to more collaborative, experimentalist, and flexible forms of governance has garnered significant academic focus, far less attention has been paid to the effects of such “new governance” approaches on regulated firms' understanding of the laws' demands, and on the structures employed within business organizations to meet them. This article targets this analytic gap by examining internal corporate practices regarding consumer privacy, an arena in which the Federal Trade Commission and the states have adopted new governance models. Using data from qualitative interviews with leading corporate Chief Privacy Officers, as well as internal corporate documentation, it examines the way privacy practices have been catalyzed in the shadow of new privacy governance approaches and the combination of regulatory, market, and stakeholder forces they seek to harness. Specifically, it suggests the convergence of a set of practices adopted by privacy officers identified as “leaders,” regarding both high‐level corporate privacy management and the integration of privacy into entity‐wide risk management goals through technology, decision‐making processes, and the empowerment of distributed expertise networks throughout the firm. 
    ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/12072.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Wed, 21 Sep 2011 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Privacy in the Smart Grid: An Information Flow Analysis</title>
    <description><![CDATA[
        Smart meters, smart devices, and gateways allowing automated control of in-home devices are linchpins in an ambitious vision of creating a Smart Grid that will increase efficiency, improve grid resilience and reliability, and reduce peak demand. The collection, retention, and use of detailed usage data, however, put individual privacy at risk. Utilities, commercial third parties, law enforcement agents, parties in civil litigation, and criminals can discern from usage patterns whether a home is occupied and, to some extent, what is occurring inside. <br />
        <br />
        The two-way communication channel also supports remote control of appliances to manage load. The ability to remotely control in-home electricity use through controlling devices within the home raises new security and privacy issues. <br />
        <br />
        The Smart Grid is developing rapidly. Smart Grid systems are generating, collecting, and processing information that is far more voluminous and revealing than traditional meter data. Decisions about how best to address the emerging privacy issues – whether through technical design, best practices, or regulation – lag behind development of the system infrastructure. <br />
        <br />
        This report documents the Smart Grid information flows and considers the laws and agencies that protect, or could protect, privacy in this new technological landscape. Legal sources of privacy protection are highly varied, ranging from state public utilities commissions to the Federal Trade Commission. The extent and level of privacy protection depends critically upon the route information takes from source to destination. Though state utilities regulators have traditionally played a strong role in protecting customer privacy, like other regulators, their jurisdiction is limited. Changes in the architecture of the energy grid that create new data flows and empower new players to handle data threaten to render some privacy provisions obsolete and others ineffective. Given the proliferation of data, industry players, and usage models, new laws and privacy-protecting technical designs are necessary to afford privacy, comparable to that enjoyed today, to users of tomorrow’s energy network. Considering privacy upfront, rather than after technologies are deployed, will help build privacy protections into the Smart Grid while supporting other energy policy goals. 
    ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/11196.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 21 Apr 2011 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Catalyzing Privacy: New Governance, Information Practices, and the Business Organization </title>
    <description><![CDATA[While the turn from traditional regulation to more collaborative, experimentalist, and flexible forms of governance has garnered significant academic focus, far less attention has been paid to the effects of such “New Governance” approaches on regulated firms’ understanding of the laws’ demands, and on the structures employed within business organizations to meet them. This article targets this analytic gap by examining internal corporate practices regarding consumer privacy, an arena in which the Federal Trade Commission and the States have adopted new governance models. Using data from qualitative interviews with leading corporate Chief Privacy Officers, as well as internal corporate documentation, it examines the way privacy practices have been catalyzed in the shadow of new privacy governance approaches, and the combination of regulatory, market and stakeholder forces they seek to harness. Specifically, it suggests the convergence of a set of practices adopted by privacy officers identified as “leaders,” both regarding high-level corporate privacy management, and regarding the integration of privacy into entity-wide risk management goals through technology, decisionmaking processes, and the empowerment of distributed expertise networks throughout the firm. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10060.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 02 Nov 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Privacy on the Books and on the Ground </title>
    <description><![CDATA[U.S. privacy law is under attack. Scholars and advocates criticize it as weak, incomplete, and confusing, and argue that it fails to empower individuals to control the use of their personal information. These critiques present a largely accurate description of the law “on the books.” But the debate has strangely ignored privacy “on the ground” — since 1994, no one has conducted a sustained inquiry into how corporations actually manage privacy, and what motivates them.
<P>This Article presents findings from the first study of corporate privacy management in fifteen years, involving qualitative interviews with Chief Privacy Officers identified by their peers as industry leaders. Spurred by these findings, we present a descriptive account of privacy “on the ground” that upends the terms of the prevailing policy debate. This alternative account identifies elements neglected by the traditional story — the emergence of the Federal Trade Commission as a privacy regulator, the increasing influence of privacy advocates, market and media pressures for privacy-protection, and the rise of privacy professionals — and traces the ways in which these players supplemented a privacy debate largely focused on processes (such as notice and consent mechanisms) with a growing emphasis on substance: preventing violations of consumers’ expectations of privacy.</P>
<P>This “grounded” account should inform privacy reforms. While widespread efforts to expand consent mechanisms to empower individuals to control their personal information may offer some promise, those efforts should not proceed in a way that eclipses robust substantive definitions of privacy and the protections they are beginning to produce, or that constrains the regulatory flexibility that permits their evolution. This would destroy important tools for limiting corporate over-reaching, curbing consumer manipulation, and protecting shared expectations about the personal sphere on the Internet, and in the marketplace. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10061.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Mon, 18 Oct 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>The Magnificence of the Disaster: Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Late in 2005, Sony BMG released millions of Compact Discs containing digital rights management technologies that threatened the security of its customers' computers and the integrity of the information infrastructure more broadly. This Article aims to identify the market, technological, and legal factors that appear to have led a presumably rational actor toward a strategy that in retrospect appears obviously and fundamentally misguided.
<P>The Article first addresses the market-based rationales that likely influenced Sony BMG's deployment of these DRM systems and reveals that even the most charitable interpretation of Sony BMG's internal strategizing demonstrates a failure to adequately value security and privacy. After taking stock of the then-existing technological environment that both encouraged and enabled the distribution of these protection measures, the Article examines law, the third vector of influence on Sony BMG's decision to release flawed protection measures into the wild, and argues that existing doctrine in the fields of contract, intellectual property, and consumer protection law fails to adequately counter the technological and market forces that allowed a self-interested actor to inflict these harms on the public.</P>
<P>The Article concludes with two recommendations aimed at reducing the likelihood of companies deploying protection measures with known security vulnerabilities in the consumer marketplace. First, Congress should alter the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) by creating permanent exemptions from its anti-circumvention and antitrafficking provisions that enable security research and the dissemination of tools to remove harmful protection measures. Second, the Federal Trade Commission should leverage insights from the field of human computer interaction security (HCI-Sec) to develop a stronger framework for user control over the security and privacy aspects of computers. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10138.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Fri, 15 Oct 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Privacy Issues of the W3C Geolocation API</title>
    <description><![CDATA[The W3C's Geolocation API may rapidly standardize the transmission of location information on the Web, but, in dealing with such sensitive information, it also raises serious privacy concerns. We analyze the manner and extent to which the current W3C Geolocation API provides mechanisms to support privacy. We propose a privacy framework for the consideration of location information and use it to evaluate the W3C Geolocation API, both the specification and its use in the wild, and recommend some modifications to the API as a result of our analysis. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10062.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Wed, 24 Feb 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Inferring Personal Information from Demand-Response Systems </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Current and upcoming demand-response systems provide increasingly detailed power-consumption data to utilities and a growing array of players angling to assist consumers in understanding and managing their energy use. The granularity of this data, as well as new players' entry into the energy market, creates new privacy concerns. The detailed per-household consumption data that advanced metering systems generate reveals information about in-home activities that such players can mine and combine with other readily available information to discover more about occupants' activities. The authors explore the technological aspects of this claim, focusing on the ways in which personally identifying information can be collected and repurposed. Their results show that, even with relatively unsophisticated hardware and data-extraction algorithms, some information about occupant behavior can be estimated with a high degree of accuracy. The authors propose a disclosure metric to aid in quantifying the impact of data collection on in-home privacy and construct an example metric for their experiment. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10063.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Transactional Confidentiality in Sensor Networks</title>
    <description><![CDATA[In a sensor network environment, elements such as message rate, message size, mote frequency, and message routing can reveal transactional data - that is, information about the sensors deployed, frequency of events monitored, network topology, parties deploying the network, and location of subjects and objects moving through the networked space. Whereas the confidentiality of network communications content is secured through encryption and authentication techniques, the ability of network outsiders and insiders to observe transactional data can also compromise network confidentiality. Four types of transactional data are typically observable in sensor networks. Measures to limit the availability and utility of transactional data are essential to preserving confidentiality in sensor networks. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10064.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 05 Aug 2008 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Privacy Decisionmaking in Administrative Agencies </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Administrative agencies increasingly rely on technology to achieve substantive goals. Often this technology is employed to collect, exchange, manipulate and store personally identifiable information, raising serious concerns about the erosion of personal privacy.
<P>Congress has recognized this problem. In the E-Government Act of 2002, it required administrative agencies to conduct privacy impact assessments (PIAs) when developing or procuring technology systems that handle personal information. Despite this new requirement, however, agency adherence to privacy mandates is highly inconsistent.</P>
<P>In this paper, we ask why. We first explore why both process requirements and traditional means of political oversight are often weak tools for ensuring that policy reflects privacy commitments. We then consider what factors might, by contrast, promote agency consideration of privacy concerns.</P>
<P>Specifically, we compare decisions by two federal agencies - the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security - to use RFID technology, which allows a wireless-access data chip to be attached to or inserted into a product, animal, or person. These two cases suggest the importance of internal agency structure, culture, and personnel, as well as alternative forms of external oversight, interest group engagement, and professional expertise, as important mechanisms for ensuring bureaucratic accountability to the secondary privacy mandate imposed by Congress.</P>
<P>The analysis speaks to debates in both public administration and privacy protection. It implicates disputes over the efficacy of external controls on bureaucracy, and the less-developed literature on opening the black box of administrative decisionmaking. It further offers insight into pre-conditions necessary to advance privacy commitments in the face of social and bureaucratic pressure to manage risk by collecting information about individuals. Finally, it offers specific proposals for policy reform intended to promote agency accountability to privacy goals. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10137.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 13 Mar 2008 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Taking the 'Long View' on the Fourth Amendment: Stored Records and the Sanctity of the Home </title>
    <description><![CDATA[In the wake of the California energy crisis of 2000-2001, the California Energy Commission and California Public Utilities Commission are aggressively pursuing "demand response" energy programs aimed at reducing peak energy demand. Demand response systems convey information about market conditions through pricing or reliability signals to customers, who in turn, hopefully, alter their electricity consumption choices. One complication with such systems is that they radically increase the amount of information about activities inside the home that the electricity company can see. In some parts of California, smart meters are being installed that will send information in intervals ranging from 15 minutes to one hour. This is 750-3000 times more information than the monthly meter read that has been the norm for many years. The case law generally considers information held by utilities to be "business records," subject to far less privacy protections than information kept inside the home. In this Article, Deirdre Mulligan and Jack Lerner argue that courts and policymakers should take "the long view" of technology that reveals information about activities inside the home, and give greater protection to such information - whether it is held by utilities or by an individual. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10139.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 28 Feb 2008 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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