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<title>Law and Tech Research feed - Menell</title>
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    <title>Promoting Patent Claim Clarity </title>
    <description><![CDATA[
        Fuzzy patent claim boundaries undermine the functioning of the patent system by making it difficult for inventors and competitors to assess freedom to operate in many technology marketplaces, especially those relating to computer software and business methods. This commentary advocates the use of a detailed, electronic, claim application form to address this problem. By placing greater responsibility on patent applicants to delineate the precise boundaries of their claims -- by, for example, specifically indicating whether they intend to invoke the means-plus-function claim format by checking a box -- patent examiners could more easily evaluate what is being claimed, competitors could more easily know contested intellectual territory, and courts could more easily construe patent claims. 
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    <pubDate>Wed, 07 Nov 2012 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Notice Failure and Notice Externalities</title>
    <description><![CDATA[
        Economic theory suggests that notice plays a critical role in resource development. Resource developers will be disinclined to make significant investments without reasonable confidence that their projects will not violate the rights of others. Land rights systems and institutions generally provide reliable notice at relatively modest cost, enabling exclusionary rights to encourage efficient real estate development. Property boundaries, right structures, and neighbors with whom resource developers might have to negotiate conflicts can usually be ascertained relatively easily. Furthermore, zoning institutions generally provide relatively prompt, low cost, and reliable dispute resolution before developers need to expend substantial resources. Therefore, land claims do not usually impose substantial external costs upon developers. <br />
        <br />
        Effective notice is a far greater challenge when the resources in question are intangible. Such resources can be difficult to navigate because of the amorphous nature of intangible boundaries, the difficulty of determining whether an intangible resource is already “owned” (unlike tangible assets, the non-rivalrous nature of intangibles means that multiple developers can possess them simultaneously without affecting others’ use of the resource), and the complex rights associated with intangibles (e.g., patent’s doctrine of equivalents; copyright’s fair use doctrine). <br />
        <br />
        The emergence of intangible resources such as intellectual property illuminates a previously unrecognized market failure: what we call a “notice externality.” The incentives of those claiming intellectual property diverge from the social interest. Notice information is a public good. Private parties tend to under-provide public goods because they do not appropriate the full value of their investments. Moreover, inventors and creators can sometimes benefit from obfuscating the scope of rights and keeping others in the dark about their intellectual property. This article explores the principal causes of notice failure in the development of intangible resources and offers a multi-faceted framework for diagnosing the causes of notice failure and preventing, internalizing, and ameliorating adverse effects. 
    ]]></description>
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    <pubDate>Sat, 18 Feb 2012 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Design for Symbiosis: Promoting More Harmonious Paths for Technological Innovators and Expressive Creators in the Internet Age </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Drawing upon historical patterns and the symbiotic relationship between distribution platforms and creative expression, this commentary examines the problems currently dividing the technology and content sectors over Internet copyright enforcement. It highlights two key factors causing the dysfunction -- the vertical fragmentation of distribution platforms in the Internet Age and the limited capacity for legislation to keep pace with technological change. The commentary suggests that cross-industry collaboration, such as the recently adopted graduated response Memorandum of Understanding between ISPs and content industries as well as the Principles for User Generated Content Services, offers a promising alternative pathway for surmounting the current enforcement challenges and forging sustainable institutions for addressing future problems. ]]></description>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Jumping the Grooveshark: A Case Study in DMCA Safe Harbor Abuse </title>
    <description><![CDATA[This commentary examines the controversy over Grooveshark, an on-demand music streaming service that has provided access to much of the catalogs of the major record labels without licenses from three of the four majors. It raises questions about how such reliable access could have been sustained under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's notice and take-down regime and highlights real problems plaguing legitimate commerce in the digital music marketplace. ]]></description>
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    <pubDate>Wed, 21 Dec 2011 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Infringement Conflation</title>
    <description><![CDATA[
        Following the most tumultuous decade in copyright history, Professor John Tehranian’s recent book – Infringement Nation: Copyright 2.0 and You – promises a broad-ranging account of the complexities of copyright infringement in the Internet Age. There can be little doubt that copyright infringement has exploded since Napster ushered in Web 2.0 a little more than a decade ago. On the positive side of the ledger, millions of ordinary netizens create, distribute, and share countless new and original user-generated works on a daily basis. There is also little doubt, however, that a massive volume of clearly infringing user-uploaded professional content courses through the Internet. <br />
        <br />
        This essay critically analyzes Professor Tehranian’s selective account of the “infringement nation.” While jammed with historical tidbits, intriguing anecdotes, and illustrations of over-enforcement by copyright owners, Infringement Nation barely mentions the effects of unauthorized distribution of copyrighted works on composers, recording artists, film producers, screenwriters, novelists, or journalists. What little Infringement Nation has to say about Internet piracy centers on the risk of crushing liability that copyright law imposes on file-sharers. This distorted infringement “census” leads to misdirected policy recommendations.<br />
        <br />
        After exposing the limitations of Infringement Nation’s lens, this essay fills in important missing regions from the census – the professional content industries that have been struggling to deal with rampant unauthorized distribution of their works. With this fuller picture of the infringement landscape in mind, the essay closes by exploring the challenge of channeling consumers back into the content marketplace. 
    ]]></description>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs</title>
    <description><![CDATA[
        The article describes how the first courts to address the scope of copyright protection for application programs have tended to view application programming as predominantly an exercise in creative expression and accordingly have interpreted the scope of copyright protection in this area quite broadly. As Part I explains, however, many design choices in writing application programs are made by applying the principles of the scientific fields of human factor analysis and software engineering. Thus, the tendency of courts to view application programming as more akin to literary creativity than to scientific and engineering advancement threatens to give broad legal protection to basic principles of human factor analysis and software engineering without requiring the creators of the programs embodying those principles to satisfy the more exacting standards of patent law. The article concludes that a careful application of the idea/expression merger doctrine, recognizing the importance of scientific considerations in application programming and the need to standardize computer-human interfaces, would both foster the invention, development, and diffusion of improved application programs and comport with basic copyright principles. 
    ]]></description>
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    <pubDate>Sun, 16 Oct 2011 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software</title>
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        This article applies economic analysis to the design of legal protection for computer software. 
    ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/12075.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Sun, 16 Oct 2011 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software</title>
    <description><![CDATA[
        This article examines three critical, interrelated challenges for reforming legal protection for computer software: (1) analyzing the market failures that might justify government intervention to define (or alter) the legal entitlements granted for software innovations; (2) predicting the likely path of computer technology; and (3) anticipating and navigating potential impediments to legislative reform of legal protection for software. It warns that patent protection for computer software poses serious potential problems and should be addressed before powerful economic interests vest in large software patent portfolios. 
    ]]></description>
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    <pubDate>Sun, 16 Oct 2011 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>An Epitaph for Traditional Copyright Protection of Network Features of Computer Software</title>
    <description><![CDATA[
        This article describes the evolution of copyright protection for computer software. It shows how the courts successfully deployed and adapted copyright doctrines in a manner that protected software against piracy while at the same time allowing for competition and innovation. 
    ]]></description>
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    <pubDate>Sun, 16 Oct 2011 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>The Mixed Heritage of Federal Intellectual Property Law and Ramifications for Statutory Interpretation</title>
    <description><![CDATA[
        This article explores the unique and complex mix of statutory provisions and common law jurisprudence that characterizes federal intellectual property law. Patent and copyright law trace their roots back to terse 1790 enactments on which the judiciary embroidered critical requirements and limitations. In line with common law traditions and less formal division between legislative and judicial roles in the early republic, courts established many critical doctrines and frameworks, including patentable subject matter limitations, patent’s inventiveness (non-obviousness) standard, patent and copyright infringement and indirect infringement doctrines, patent’s experimental use, and copyright’s fair use, among other important doctrines. The rapidity and unpredictability of technological change have continually buffeted courts with new challenges. Jurists have drawn upon their common law background, tort law and equitable principles, and pragmatism to evolve the patent and copyright systems. This response system in conjunction with Congress’s institutional impediments to responding quickly to technological change has enhanced the judiciary’s substantive imprint on federal intellectual property law. It has enhanced intellectual property law’s sensitivity to the inherent heterogeneity of creative activity and improved its responsiveness to technological change. Congress has perpetuated these evolutionary processes – both expressly and implicitly – throughout U.S. history. Hence, courts should be especially careful to trace the provenance of copyright and patent provisions and doctrines to determine the proper lens for interpreting and evolving these laws. 
    ]]></description>
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    <pubDate>Wed, 27 Jul 2011 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework </title>
    <description><![CDATA[The construction of patent claims plays a critical role in nearly every patent case. It is central to evaluation of infringement and validity, and can affect or determine the outcome of other significant issues such as unenforceability, enablement, and remedies. Yet jurists and scholars have long lamented the challenges of construing patent claim terms. Drawing upon more than a decade of working with the Federal Judicial Center, leading jurists in those districts with the largest patent dockets, experienced litigators, and academics, this article provides a pragmatic and cohesive framework and roadmaps for navigating this rapidly evolving landscape as well as guidance on the best practices for managing claim construction. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10328.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Sun, 09 Jan 2011 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Ground Patent Law Interpretation and Return Patent Law to its Technology Mooring </title>
    <description><![CDATA[This article critically analyzes Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court’s first decision on patentable subject matter since the early 1980s. It shows how the majority’s effort to shoehorn patentable subject matter into a superficial textualist mold obfuscates patentable subject matter boundaries and undermines the patent system on multiple levels. The article contends that the patentable subject matter pathology cannot be cured without confronting the roots of the disease: the lack of a forthright principled framework for delineating the boundaries of patentable subject matter. The solution lies in recognizing that patentable subject matter cannot evolve to meet the new challenges of the information age without integrating 18th, 19th, and 20th century sources of patentable subject law into a flexible and evolving body of common law that is sensitive to history, statutory evolution, constitutional constraints, and understanding of modern science and technology. This will be particularly important as courts confront the patentability of DNA compounds, diagnostic tests, and unforeseeable information age innovations. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10346.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Sun, 26 Dec 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Prior to the emergence of peer-to-peer technology, the Copyright Act’s distribution right was largely dormant. Most enforcement actions were premised upon violations of the reproduction right. The relatively few cases invoking the distribution right involved arcane scenarios. During the past several years, direct enforcement of the Copyright Act against file sharers has brought the scope of the distribution right to center stage. Whereas the 1909 Act expressly protected the rights to “publish” and “vend,” the 1976 Act speaks of a right to “distribute.” Interpreting “distribute” narrowly, some courts have held that copyright owners must prove that a sound recording placed in a peer-to-peer share folder was actually downloaded to establish violation of the distribution right. Other courts hold that merely making a sound recording available violates the distribution right. The ramifications for copyright enforcement in the Internet age are substantial. Under the narrow interpretation, the relative anonymity of peer-to-peer transmissions in combination with privacy concerns make enforcement costly and difficult. A broad interpretation exposes millions of peer-to-peer users to potentially crushing statutory damages.
<P>Drawing upon the historical development of copyright law and the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976, this article explains why Congress selected the term “distribute” in its last omnibus revision of copyright law, shows unequivocally that Congress intended to encompass broadly the 1909 Act rights to “publish” and “vend” within the right to distribute, and rejects the position that Congress required proof of “actual distribution” to prove violation of the distribution right. This critical legislative history has been notably absent from treatise accounts and briefing on the liability standard in the file sharing cases, leaving courts without a compass to navigate this statutory terrain. This article traces the origins of the key legislative terms to elucidate the scope of the distribution right in the Internet age. </P>]]></description>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 14 Dec 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Sound Recordings, Works for Hire, and the Termination-of-Transfers Time Bomb </title>
    <description><![CDATA[In crafting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress brokered a grand compromise between authors and publishers so as to bring about a unitary term of protection. Authors obtained an inalienable right to terminate transfers 35 years after an assignment, subject to designated carve outs for nine categories of collaborative works that could become unmarketable following termination due to the transaction costs of reassembling the necessary rights. While motion pictures and encyclopedias made the list, sound recordings were not expressly covered - although they arguably fit into other designated categories. This Article traces the background to this dispute, which will likely take on great salience in 2013, when the first post-1976 works become eligible for termination. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10083.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Mon, 02 Aug 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Governance of Intellectual Resources and Disintegration of Intellectual Property in the Digital Age </title>
    <description><![CDATA[The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange brought into focus whether intellectual property policy should follow reflexively in the wake of tangible property doctrines or instead look to the distinctive market failures and institutional features of intellectual resources. Professor Richard Epstein argues in a recent article that “virtually all of the current malaise in dealing with both tangible and intellectual property stems from the failure to keep to the coherent rules of acquisition, exclusion, alienation, regulation, and condemnation that are called for by the classical liberal system . . . .” Epstein purports to validate what he calls the “carryover hypothesis”: that principles governing tangible property “do, and should, influence the growth of intellectual property law,” and that apart from durational limits on patents and copyrights, there are essentially no significant departures from the private property mold needed to optimize intellectual property. This article responds to Epstein’s premises, framework, and analysis and provides a broader and richer analytical framework for promoting innovation and creativity in the digital age. In so doing, it demonstrates that intellectual property does not and should not resemble Professor Epstein’s idealized classical liberal cathedral. To the contrary, “disintegration” characterizes the intellectual property landscape and hewing to a classical liberal private property paradigm overlooks valuable prescriptions for the evolution of the intellectual property field. While the institution of private property that has developed for tangible resources provides valuable insights into how to encourage efficient economic development, it is not a panacea for all resources, contexts, and societies. Careful consideration of the characteristics of intellectual resources, comparative institutional analysis, and empirical research provide the keys to promoting innovation and creativity. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10084.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Sun, 30 May 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Section 337 Patent Investigation Management Guide </title>
    <description><![CDATA[The U.S. International Trade Commission has emerged as one of the most salient patent enforcement venues in the United States. Its fast-track procedures – typically producing determinations within 12 to 16 months of initiation of an investigation – and potent exclusion remedy have brought the ITC to center stage in patent enforcement over the past several years. The ITC now conducts more full patent adjudications on an annual basis than any district court in the nation. The ITC’s six Section 337 administrative law judges (ALJs) focus almost exclusively upon patent investigations, making the ITC the only specialized trial-level patent adjudication forum in the nation. Given the importance of international trade to high technology markets, the ability to exclude goods at the border provides a valuable strategic option for a growing number of patent owners. This guide, modeled after the Patent Case Management Judicial Guide, provides comprehensive analysis of the management of Section 337 investigations. ]]></description>
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    <pubDate>Mon, 10 May 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the Digital Age </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Recent advances in digital technology have created the potential to make the vast stock of recorded knowledge searchable using sophisticated tools by anyone with an internet connection. As Google is in the process of demonstrating, it is now feasible to scan the collections of the major libraries of the world within a matter of years, convert these works into an immense searchable digital archive, and enable Internet users to find the most relevant materials easily. The principal impediment to this project, however, appears to be the inherent unpredictability of copyright law's fair use doctrine. Shortly after Google's announcement, leading publishers and authors filed suit alleging that Google's project infringed their copyrights.
<P>The importance of these issues, and the fact that Congress did not foresee the possibilities for a universally accessible, comprehensive archive when it last considered the role of libraries, call for Congress to consider the larger public policy ramifications of digital archiving and search technology. The goals of collecting, preserving, and cataloging human knowledge predate copyright laws. As copyright law developed, it embraced these concerns. Drawing upon this history, this article examines the democratic, cultural, and economic dimensions of developing a comprehensive, searchable database of books and other library materials. It then analyzes the spectrum of institutional alternatives for promoting the goals of preserving and providing access to knowledge while safeguarding copyright law's incentives to create. The article recommends that Congress effectuate these goals through a carefully crafted package of safe harbors, measured liability exposure for technology vulnerable to piracy, and public involvement in the development and management of a searchable digital repository of copyrighted works. For the longer term, the Article recommends that Congress update the deposit requirement to provide for digital deposit of written works and plan for the development of a public comprehensive searchable archive. In the event that legislation is not forthcoming before the Google Book Search Project is litigated, the article shows that copyright law's long-standing access and preservation goals provide an important context for courts applying copyright law's fair use doctrine to digital archiving activities. </P>]]></description>
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    <pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Pooh-Poohing Copyright Law’s 'Inalienable' Termination Rights </title>
    <description><![CDATA[From its earliest manifestations, copyright law has struggled to deal with the equitable and efficient division of value and control between creators and the enterprises that distribute their works. And for almost as long as copyright has existed, there has been concern about creators getting the short end of the stick in their dealings with distributors. Since 1909, Congress has sought to protect authors and their families by allowing them to grant their copyrights for exploitation and then, decades later, to recapture those same rights. After judicial interpretation of the 1909 Act frustrated this intent by upholding advance assignments of renewal terms, Congress spoke unambiguously in 1976: “Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary...” Yet recent decisions in the Ninth and Second Circuits have eviscerated that clear Congressional command by permitting a grantee to renegotiate the terms of the grant so as to frustrate recapture by the author’s family. After critically analyzing these decisions, this article provides a comprehensive framework for restoring the integrity and clarity of the termination of transfer provisions. ]]></description>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 29 Dec 2009 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Copyright initially developed in response to the printing press and gradually evolved to encompass other methods of mechanically storing and reproducing works of authorship, such as photography, motion pictures, and sound recordings. The advent of broadcasting - the ability to perform works at distant points - led to the expansion of copyright to encompass exploitation of creative expression in new markets. The digital revolution represents a third distinct wave of technological innovation that portends significant changes in copyright protection. By bringing about new modes of expression (such as computer programming and digital sampling of music) and empowering anyone with a computer and an Internet connection to flawlessly, inexpensively, and instantaneously reproduce and distribute works of authorship on a wide scale, digital technology represents possibly the most profound challenge to copyright law. This article divides the analysis of digital technology into two categories: (1) squeezing computer software within copyright's non-functionally oriented protection regime and (2) developing new rules and governance institutions to address the ease of reproduction and porosity of the digital platform. Part I of the article traces the two decades of evolution of copyright protection for computer software and demonstrates that copyright law has proven quite adaptable to this hybrid of expressive and utilitarian creativity. The courts have enabled copyright law to serve effectively as an anti-piracy regime without allowing it to intrude unduly into patent law's domain. This holding of the line has in fact moved the battles over legal protection for software into the patent and contract realms. Part II explores the implications of digital distribution of content for copyright's future. Content industries perceive grave threats to their continued existence (and the production of creative works) while technology companies and a growing array of consumer, programmer, and civil liberty organizations fear that further expansion of copyright protection jeopardizes technological innovation and basic civil liberties. A growing cadre of legal academics predict copyrights ultimate demise. As a basis for assessing these claims and understanding the implications of this new and rapidly improving digital platform, this article examines the technological changes taking place, industry structures, the legal environment, and the evolving social and political landscape. Although these forces remain in flux, the digital revolution can be seen increasingly to shift resources and pressure for reform toward copyright enforcement, standard setting (in an effort to develop effective controls on content distribution), antitrust regulation of standard setting processes, and a more general transformation of copyright law from a property rights orientation toward a regulatory regime. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10329.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2009 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Unwinding Sony </title>
    <description><![CDATA[The dawning of the digital age has brought the Supreme Court's Sony "staple article of commerce" doctrine to center stage in legal and policy discussions about the proper role and scope of copyright protection. To technology companies, it represents a vital safe harbor for product design; to the content industries, this doctrine remains an Achilles heel. The origins of this doctrine have always been somewhat obscure. With nary a peak at the text or the legislative history of the then-recently enacted overhaul of the copyright system, the Supreme Court adverted to patent law to determine the scope of indirect liability - a fundamental issue that would loom large in the shift from the analog to the digital distribution platform for content. A slim majority of the Supreme Court justified this interpretation of the Copyright Act of 1976 on the basis of a vague assertion of "historic kinship" between patent and copyright.
<P>This article scrutinizes this critical logical premise. Part I exhaustively reviews the litigation and correspondence of the justices to understand why the Court paid so little attention to the legislative materials and so much to the patent law. It finds that gaps in the information provided to the Court, in conjunction with the justices' lack of familiarity with copyright law generally and the Copyright Act of 1976 in particular, led the Court astray. Part II tests the "historic kinship" premise, finding that it cannot withstand scrutiny. Had the Court traced the origins of copyright and patent back to their source, it would have seen that they both derive from a common wellspring: tort principles. Concerns about patent misuse and improper leveraging of monopoly power led the courts, and later Congress, to carve out an express safe harbor in patent law for those selling "staple articles of commerce" - products suitable for substantial non-infringing uses. Part III demonstrates that the 1976 Copyright Act envisioned that courts would continue to use the traditional tort wellspring, informed by the distinctive challenges of copyright enforcement. This would have brought the reasonable alternative design framework of products liability law into play. The article shows that this approach would almost certainly have resulted in the same outcome that the Sony Court reached, but of critical importance, it would have provided a more sound and dynamic jurisprudential framework for calibrating liability as new technologies develop. Part IV examines Sony's legacy, showing that subsequent legislative activity, court decisions, and the marketplace reflect a practical reality that lies closer to the reasonable alternative design standard than a broad "staple article of commerce" safe harbor. In reality, Sony's "staple article of commerce" doctrine has proven largely symbolic and unworkable, as Congress, the courts, and businesses in the marketplace have sought to promote product innovation without unduly jeopardizing copyright protection. The failure to recognize that reality, however, breeds doctrinal confusion, distorts case law evolution, and stultifies the larger policy debate over copyright protection in the digital age. </P>]]></description>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2009 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An Economic Analysis </title>
    <description><![CDATA[With the rise of intellectual property in the modern economy, bankruptcy treatment of intellectual property assets has taken on ever greater importance. The law in this area must balance different approaches to asset management. Viewing the world from an ex ante perspective, intellectual property laws seek to foster investment in research and development. Freedom of contract plays a central role in maximizing the potential value of intellectual property by encouraging a robust licensing market to exploit the value of intellectual creativity. By contrast, the bankruptcy system generally views asset management from an ex post standpoint, focusing narrowly on how to maximize the value of a failing or failed enterprise. Thus, bankruptcy law affords trustees and debtors substantial leeway to rescind contracts and reorder the affairs of the failed entity. This article examines the rather complex rules governing the treatment of intellectual property assets in bankruptcy and suggests various reforms that could better promote economic efficiency. ]]></description>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2009 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright Liability's Continuing Tort Framework and Sony's De Facto Demise </title>
    <description><![CDATA[The Supreme Court's indirect copyright liability standard, derived in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios from patent law and reasserted in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., is widely seen as creating a safe harbor for distributors of dual use technologies. Yet, when one looks to cases decided since Sony, legislative enactments, and the decisions of technology companies in the marketplace, a very different reality emerges. This article explores and explains the broad gulf between the idealized (and idolized) Sony safe harbor and the practical reality. It shows that the law in many respects reflects the tort principles that undergird copyright liability more generally. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10339.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2009 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Nonpatentability of Business Methods: Legal and Economic Analysis </title>
    <description><![CDATA[In this brief filed in Bilski vs. Kappos, pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, we argue that the "useful Arts" limitation of the the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S.Constitution restricts the scope of Congress's patent power to technological advances. Beyond this constitutional limitation, Congress has not extended patent protection to business methods. The subject matter provision of the 1952 Patent Act merely codified existing subject matter categories and limitations, including the exclusion of business methods. The First Inventor Defense Act of 1999 did not alter this limitation on patentable subject matter. It did not amend the subject matter provision. It merely created a prior user defense. To read &sect; 273 to override more than two centuries of jurisprudence as well as &sect; 101 without an express statement to that effect would be unwarranted and unwise.
<P>We also address warnings that upholding the business method exclusion would hamper innovation. Economic research indicates that restoring the business method exclusion could well promote progress, innovation, and competition. Although we doubt that these considerations bear significantly if at all on the interpretive questions before the Court, they should certainly not be weighed on the side of extending patent protection to business methods.</P>
<P>The courts and the Patent Office successfully navigated the line between technological and non-technological fields for over two centuries. Patent systems throughout the world continue to do so. Reestablishing technological advance as the touchstone for patent protection in the United States will help to restore confidence in, the efficacy of, and the logic of this vital institution. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10342.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2009 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Indirect Copyright Liability and Technological Innovation </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Over the past decade, numerous scholars and commentators have asserted that the indirect copyright liability standards applied in the Napster, Aimster, and Grokster decisions, among others, significantly chill technological innovation. This article examines this critical conjecture and offers both a broader framework for assessing the relationship between indirect copyright liability and technological innovation and some suggestive empirical results. The conceptual analysis demonstrates that the question of whether indirect copyright liability chills technological innovation inherently requires consideration of a broader range of social balances, market mechanisms, and roles for mediating institutions. Several countervailing forces, such as the relatively modest capital requirements associated with the technology at issue, the nature of the many established research environments, the philosophical and cultural orientation of many digital technology researchers, various liability-insulating institutions, the ability of investors and technology companies to manage risk, and the importance of technological advance in fields unaffected by copyright liability, suggest that the effects of indirect copyright liability on innovation in replication and distribution technologies will be less dire and more complex than the conjecture suggests. Moreover, the Chilled Innovation conjecture downplays the beneficial effects of indirect copyright liability on the development of balanced technologies (those that tend to balance incentives to create copyrighted works with advances in information dissemination) while ignoring the adverse effects of broad immunity, which fosters deployment of parasitic technologies that tend to drive out balanced technologies. To the extent that the Chilled Innovation conjecture has force, it is not at the basic research and development stages of the innovation pipeline, but rather at the commercialization stage – which is where in the innovation process such effects are most appropriately focused. This limits the effects of choking innovation in its infancy. The article also offers a partial test of the chilled innovation conjecture by examining academic research and patent data. The findings indicate that the Napster-Aimster-Grokster trilogy does not appear to have derailed technological innovation in the peer-to-peer field. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10341.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2009 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Patent Case Management Judicial Guide </title>
    <description><![CDATA[As the number, size, and complexity of patent cases have grown throughout the United States over the past several decades - paralleling expansion in the role of high technology enterprises in the U.S. economy - the need for a comprehensive, user-friendly, and practical judicial guide for managing patent cases has become increasingly apparent. Although similar in many respects to other forms of complex civil litigation, patent cases pose distinctive case management challenges. Patent cases feature complex and dynamic technological facts to a degree rarely encountered in most other areas of litigation. Furthermore, they employ unique procedures (such as claim construction hearings) that affect and interact with other aspects of the case (such as summary judgment motions and expert reports) in ways that create unusual scheduling and substantive complexity. In addition, patent cases often entail distinctive and difficult discovery issues, extensive use of experts, and particularly complex dispositive and pre-trial motion practice.
<P>Because of the decentralized, general jurisdiction structure of federal courts in the United States, much of the experience relating to managing patent cases is silo-ed in particular judicial chambers. As one jurist aptly noted, best practices for patent case management have been transmitted largely through word of mouth. Given the crowded, diverse dockets of federal courts, the accessibility and reliability of such knowledge is far from ideal. Judges in some districts have partially codified recommended practices in the form of Patent Local Rules, standing orders, and patent jury instructions, but these documents do not address the full range of distinctive challenges posed by patent litigation. Furthermore, such judicial wisdom continues to evolve.</P>
<P>Recognizing these patterns, the authors undertook in 2006 to survey the range of approaches and perspectives on patent case management, foster discussion and analysis of patent case management techniques, and develop an authoritative guide for judges, law clerks, practitioners, and patent and civil procedure professors and scholars. Given the dynamism of the patent system and patent litigation, the authors plan to revise the Guide on a biennial basis. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10326.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2009 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Judicial Resistance to Copyright Law's Inalienable Right to Terminate Transfers </title>
    <description><![CDATA[For a century, Congress has sought to protect authors and their families by allowing them to grant their copyrights for exploitation and then, decades later, recapture those same rights. After judicial interpretation of the 1909 Act frustrated this intent, Congress spoke unambiguously in 1976: Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary . . . . 17 U.S.C. Section 304(c)(5). Yet, in Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit eviscerated that clear Congressional command by enabling a grantee to renegotiate the terms of the grant so as to frustrate recapture by the author's family. This ruling follows a Ninth Circuit decision similarly allowing a grantee to go through the charade of rescinding and regranting a copyright license for the express purpose of blocking the author's family members from exercising their statutory termination rights. Milne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005). Notwithstanding the unequivocal meaning of the word any in Section 304(c)(5), explicated unmistakably in the legislative history, these decisions invite grantees to engage in all manner of opportunistic behavior to frustrate Congress' clearly expressed language and intent. In this amicus brief supporting grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court in the Steinbeck case, the authors argue that the Court can restore the intergenerational equity that Congress legislated and remove the cloud now hanging over innumerable copyrighted works. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10345.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 10 Mar 2009 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Intellectual Property and the Law of Land</title>
    <description><![CDATA[In his response to my previous Regulation article, Professor Richard Epstein misses the gist and key implications of my criticism of his position. My essay questioned his overreliance on claims of structural unity between real and intellectual property systems, a claim he makes in a 2006 Progress &amp; Freedom Foundation paper. Professor Epstein responds by citing a more balanced view that he espoused in a 2001 Indiana Law Review article. If he is now saying that his 2006 paper does not really express his views, then that clarification is worth noting. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10338.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Sun, 24 Feb 2008 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement</title>
    <description><![CDATA[The article examines the recent efforts of the Property Rights Movement to expand the "property tent" to emcompass intellectual property. In eBay v. MercExchange, a case addressing the standard for injunctive relief in patent cases, some property rights advocates argued that the Supreme Court should look to trespass and encroachment cases to establish a strong presumption favoring a right to a permanent injunction. More generally, Professor Richard Epstein has suggested that "structural unity" between real and intellectual property should guide courts and legislatures to use the real property mold in evolving intellectual property law. This article shows that the origins, philosophical foundations, and economic ramifications of real and intellectual property are quite distinct and that uncritically basing intellectual property law on a real property analogy is likely to cause more harm than good. The article also suggests that property rights advocates' effort to expand the "property tent" to include intellectual property is likely to backfire, calling attention to the interdependency of resources and the need for a significant government role in governing allocation and use of property. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10332.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jul 2007 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>The Property Rights Movement's Embrace of Intellectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship? </title>
    <description><![CDATA[The recent Supreme Court battle over the legal standard for permanent injunctions in patents cases (eBay v. MercExchange) marked an important new front in the Property Rights Movement's campaign to establish a strict and broad interpretation of property rights and their enforcement. This essay explores whether Professor Richard Epstein's embrace of intellectual property rights is likely to produce a durable marriage of traditional property rights theory and intellectual property protection or merely represents a fling that will not withstand divisive relational pressures. It shows that philosophical, functional, intellectual, and political tensions stand in the way of a stable or enduring relationship between advocates of strong and unyielding property rights and intellectual property owners. The need for dynamism and adaptability within the intellectual property rights field may well weaken the support for absolutism in property jurisprudence and policy, reinforcing the shift away from the Blackstonian conception of property. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10333.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Mon, 26 Feb 2007 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>A Method for Reforming the Patent System </title>
    <description><![CDATA[The principal recent studies of patent reform (NAS (2004), FTC (2003), Jaffe and Lerner (2004)) contend that a uniform system of patent protection must (or should) be available for anything under the sun made by man based upon one or more of the following premises: (1) the Patent Act requires such breadth and uniformity of treatment; (2) discriminating against any particular field of technology would be undesirable; (3) discrimination among technologies would present insurmountable boundary problems and could easily be circumvented through clever patent drafting; and (4) interest group politics stand in the way of excluding any subject matter classes from patent law or reforming the patent law requirements, duration, defenses, or remedies for a particular subject matter class. As a result, these studies consider and recommend reforms that would apply to all fields of patentable subject matter (systemic reforms) and largely ignore reforms that would either bar particular classes of technology from patent protection (e.g., software, business method, genomic sequences) or afford different classes of patentable subject matter different requirements or remedies (categorical reforms). This article sets forth a method for evaluating and formulating patent policy that considers both systemic and categorical reforms and sketches out how that method could be applied to the current patent crisis. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10337.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jan 2007 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Regulating 'Spyware': The Limitations of State 'Laboratories' and the Case for Federal Preemption of State Unfair Competition Laws </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Drawing on Justice Brandeis's oft-cited observation that states can serve as "laboratories" of policy experimentation, this Article develops a framework for assessing the allocation of governance authority for regulating Internet activities. In particular, it focuses on whether states should be free to experiment with regulatory approaches or whether the federal government should have principal, if not exclusive (preemptive), regulatory authority over Internet-related activities. Using recent efforts to regulate spyware and adware as a case study, the analysis shows that the lack of harmonization of, and uncertainty surrounding, state unfair competition law produces costly, confusing, multi-district litigation and pushes enterprises to adhere to the limits of the most restrictive state. Such a governance regime unduly hinders innovation in Internet business models. On this basis, the Article favors a uniform federal regulatory system and pre-emption of state statutes and unfair competition common law as applied to spyware and adware. The final section of the Article extrapolates from this study of spyware and adware regulation to the larger context of Internet governance. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10344.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2005 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Intellectual Property </title>
    <description><![CDATA[This chapter of the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics (A.M. Polinsky &amp; S. Shavell (eds.)) provides a comprehensive survey of the burgeoning literature on the law and economics of intellectual property. It is organized around the two principal objectives of intellectual property law: promoting innovation and aesthetic creativity (focusing on patent and copyright protection) and protecting integrity of the commercial marketplace (trademark protection and unfair competition law). Each section sets forth the economic problem, the principal models and analytical frameworks, application of economic analysis to particular structural and doctrinal issues, interactions with other legal regimes (such as competition policy), international dimensions, and comparative analysis of intellectual property protection and other means of addressing the economic problem (such as public funding and prizes in the case of patent and copyright law and direct consumer protection statutes and public enforcement in the case of trademarks). ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10327.htm</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10327.htm</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 15 Jul 2005 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Indirect Copyright Liability: A Re-examination of Sony's Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine</title>
    <description><![CDATA[This article is based on an amicus brief filed in METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS INC., et al., v. GROKSTER, LTD., a case before the U.S. Supreme Court addressing indirect copyright liability for distribution of software that facilitates file sharing on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. This case turns on whether the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), effectively immunizes the software distributors in this case from contributory or vicarious liability on the grounds that such software is capable of substantial non-infringing use.
<P>The article re-examines Sony's jurisprudential foundation. In that case, the Court transplanted an express categorical limitation on indirect liability from the Patent Act into the Copyright Act, notwithstanding that Congress had only recently reformed the Copyright Act without including any such limitation on liability among the many express exemptions, limitations, and immunities contained in the statute. Furthermore, Congress reaffirmed the continued applicability and evolution of infringement standards through case-by-case adjudication. The Sony decision failed to examine the important differences between patent and copyright protection. Whereas patent law seeks to promote technological innovation and evolved a staple article of commerce doctrine primarily out of concern for unduly expanding patent scope, copyright law seeks to promote cultural and social progress, manifesting a more cautious stance toward technological dissemination, particularly where a technology threatens widespread piracy of expressive works. Products that encourage patent infringement do not threaten harm beyond a single patent or cluster of patents, whereas the technology at issue in the Grokster case threatens systemic harm to the copyright system by promoting rampant unauthorized distribution of all manner of works of authorship. Therefore, the uncritical transplantation of Patent Act's immunity for dual-use technologies into the Copyright Act poses grave dangers that were beyond the Supreme Court's view when it decided the Sony case in 1984, before the digital revolution took hold. Furthermore, amendments to the Copyright Act since the Sony decision demonstrate that Congress does not believe that dual-use technology - i.e., technology that is capable of both infringing and substantial non-infringing uses - should be treated as inviolate under copyright law. Rather, Congress has shown that it sees a need to balance the efficacy of the copyright system for promoting creative expression against social interests in technological innovation and consumer autonomy. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10336.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Fri, 11 Mar 2005 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>An Economic Assessment of Market-Based Approaches to Regulating the Municipal Solid Waste Stream </title>
    <description><![CDATA[In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was widely reported that the United States faced a solid waste crisis. Existing landfills were reaching capacity or being shut down because of more stringent regulations while waste volumes were continuing to rise. At the time, several market-oriented policy analysts advocated the adoption of variable rate charges for mixed refuse in conjunction with curbside pick-up of recyclables (without charge) as a means of reducing waste volumes and diverting recyclable material to more valuable uses. During the course of the past decade, such policies have been adopted widely throughout the United States - approximately 20 percent of the U.S. population now face variable rate charges for mixed refuse collection. Even more have curbside collection of recyclable materials. This article collects and reviews empirical studies evaluating the effects of variable rate pricing. It finds that these policies have been quite effective as a means of boosting diversion rates beyond the levels that can be achieved through curbside collection of recyclables alone. The overall cost-benefit analysis of such programs is modestly favorable. Since many states and communities have committed to achieving specified waste diversion targets, variable rate policies have been a cost effective policy tool. The experience with variable rate policies represents a promising example of non-coercive, information-oriented government intervention. With a relatively small budget and no authority to impose household solid waste policy on local governments, EPA has been remarkably successful at developing and diffusing effective solid waste management policies. The economic theory underlying variable rate pricing has proven, after some tinkering at the implementation stage, to be quite workable in practice. In fact, the practical realities of implementing charges have shown that theoretical perfection in terms of getting the prices right is less important in the grand scheme than keeping the transaction costs manageable. Looking forward, variable rate pricing can be expected to become even more economically advantageous as recycling markets continue to mature, landfill tipping fees rise, and improved technologies for curbside collection, monitoring, billing, and measuring waste develop. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10335.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Sat, 11 Sep 2004 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Pre-existing Confusion in Copyright's Work-for-Hire Doctrine</title>
    <description><![CDATA[In order to protect authors and artists from unremunerative transfers of copyright, Congress for the first time created, in the Copyright Act of 1976, an inalienable right to terminate transfers of copyrights during a five-year window beginning 35 years from the date of the transfer. Such inalienablity, however, posed substantial uncertainty to the exploitation of many works of authorship. In particular, works combining multiple copyrighted elements - such as collective works and motion pictures - could become unavailable due to the difficulty of relicensing all of the constituent components. For that reason, Congress provided a mechanism for precluding termination of at least some transfers. In the case of a "work made for hire," the hiring party acquires ownership of the copyright upon a work's creation, thereby dispensing with any transfer from the author and hence obviating any termination of such transfer 35 years later. To avoid the exception swallowing the rule, Congress circumscribed the situations under which a work qualifies for treatment as a "work made for hire." It must either be prepared by a true employee or specially ordered or commissioned and fall within one of nine categories, such as "contribution to a collective work" and "part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work."
<P>This article examines a potentially significant and heretofore unrecognized conundrum of the 1976 Copyright Act relating to the "contribution to a collective work" category. Congress defined "collective works" as comprised of "preexisting materials." Yet the work made for hire provision contemplates "contributions to collective works" being specially ordered or commissioned. How is it possible for a publisher or record label to specially order or commission contributions that already exist? The authors' journey into the complex evolution of the 1976 Copyright Act reveals that Congress did not intend that "contributions to collective works" preexist their commissioning, even though the inartful drafting of some of the Section 101 definitions suggest otherwise. For purposes of applying the work for hire doctrine, courts should either ignore the use of the term "preexisting" in the definition of "collective work," or interpret the term "contribution to collective work" to include "contribution to yet-to-be-assembled collective work" in the definition of "work made for hire." The article also elucidates the legislative history underlying the right to terminate transfers, a right which will have justiciable implications beginning in 2003. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10331.htm</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10331.htm</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 17 Dec 2002 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights </title>
    <description><![CDATA[In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decisions constraining Congress' ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity, Professor Peter S. Menell examines the propensity of states and state actors to infringe federal intellectual property rights, the viability of alternative means of protecting federal intellectual property rights, and potential implications of the Supreme Court's decisions for international intellectual property diplomacy. He concludes that although state sovereign immunity for violations of federal intellectual property rights is unlikely to impair the rights of intellectual property owners because of a broad array of legal, market, social, and political restraints upon states and state actors, such immunity could violate international treaty obligations and complicate foreign diplomacy. These latter concerns potentially provide an alternative basis for congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity for infringement of federal intellectual property rights. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10343.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jan 2001 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Economic Implications of Erisa </title>
    <description><![CDATA[If the intent of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, ERISA, was to assure that beneficiaries of insolvent pension plans receive adequate pension benefits, sharp increases in nominal rates of interest have blunted that purpose. Without an increase in these rates, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, PBGC, the insurance agency established to guarantee benefits, faced large liabilities on the terminations of pension plans. We examine the economics of pension funds and the funding of pension funds before and after the enactment of ERISA. The Act changed the economics of pension funds. The PBGC, the employer, and the employees have interests in the assets of the pension plan. The PBGC can tax corporations to pay off liabilities and to fund guaranteed benefits; employers can terminate pension plans or overfund them; employees can ask for more benefits or claim the assets in the fund. Although the PBGC insures benefits, the insurance agent forbears, not acting quickly to protect its own interests. To prevent potential huge increases in its liabilities, the PBGC could require that employers hedge the guaranteed benefits, and fund their increases in promised benefits. Given its policies, these requirements could protect the PBGC.]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/12764.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Wed, 14 Jul 1982 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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