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<title>Law and Tech Research feed - Kapczynski</title>
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<link>http://law.berkeley.edu</link>
<lastBuildDate> 11:12:55 -0400 </lastBuildDate>
<pubDate> 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>


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    <title>Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of 'Secondary' Pharmaceutical Patents</title>
    <description><![CDATA[
        &nbsp;<span>While
        there has been much discussion by policymakers and stakeholders about
        the effects of “secondary patents” on the pharmaceutical industry, there
        is no empirical evidence on their prevalence or determinants.
        Characterizing the landscape of secondary patents is important in light
        of recent court decisions in the U.S. that may make them more difficult
        to obtain, and for developing countries considering restrictions on
        secondary patents. <br />
        <br />
        We read the claims of the 1304 Orange Book
        listed patents on all new molecular entities approved in the U.S.
        between 1988 and 2005, and coded the patents as including chemical
        compound claims (claims covering the active molecule itself) and/or one
        of several types of secondary claims. We distinguish between patents
        with any secondary claims, and those with only secondary claims and no
        chemical compound claims (“independent” secondary patents). <br />
        <br />
        We
        find that secondary claims are common in the pharmaceutical industry. We
        also show that independent secondary patents tend to be filed and
        issued later than chemical compound patents, and are also more likely to
        be filed after the drug is approved. When present, independent
        formulation patents add an average of 6.5 years of patent life (95%
        C.I.: 5.9 to 7.3 years), independent method of use patents add 7.4 years
        (95% C.I.: 6.4 to 8.4 years), and independent patents on polymorphs,
        isomers, prodrug, ester, and/or salt claims add 6.3 years (95% C.I.: 5.3
        to 7.3 years). We also provide evidence that late-filed independent
        secondary patents are more common for higher sales drugs. <br />
        <br />
        Policies
        and court decisions affecting secondary patenting are likely to have a
        significant impact on the pharmaceutical industry. Secondary patents
        provide substantial additional patent life in the pharmaceutical
        industry, at least nominally. Evidence that they are also more common
        for best-selling drugs is consistent with accounts of active “life cycle
        management” or “evergreening” of patent portfolios in the industry.  </span>
    ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/14908.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Wed, 10 Oct 2012 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism</title>
    <description><![CDATA[
        The field of intellectual property (IP) law today is focused, as the name itself advertises, on one particular institutional approach to scientific and cultural production: IP. When legal scholars explain this focus, they typically do so with reference to the virtues of price. Because price gives us a decentralized way to link social welfare to the production of information, IP is alleged to be more efficient than other approaches. The dominant mode of IP scholarship begins here and then addresses questions internal to IP law — for example, how broad or narrow should exceptions to IP rights be? But the internalism that characterizes the field of IP cannot, as I show, be justified by the value of efficiency. Economics offers us no a priori reason to assume that IP is more efficient than other possible approaches, most prominently government procurement and commons-based production. If we take the invitation that economists offer us to think external to IP, we also gain new insights about the implications of values other than efficiency for the choice between different institutional approaches to scientific and cultural production.<br />
        <br />
        We see, as I argue, that using price to guide scientific and cultural production — which is to say, using IP — may have costs not only for efficiency, but also for distributive justice and informational privacy. The IP approach is in tension with the value of distributive justice because reliance upon price may yield not only unjust distribution of existing information resources but also unjust production of future information resources. The IP approach is in tension with the value of information privacy because relying on price to generate information facilitates the desire, the demand, and perhaps the capacity for price discrimination. That, in turn, generates an impulse for the extensive collection of personal information. Both government procurement and commons-based production plausibly offer more promise than does IP in both distributive justice and privacy terms, and they may be no less efficient than IP. Giving full scope to all three of these values thus requires us to telescope out from the internalism that characterizes the field, and to countenance a broader role for commons-based production and government procurement. In the field of IP, I conclude, we should pay less attention to IP and more to the alternatives. 
    ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/14562.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Fri, 11 May 2012 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Access to Knowledge: A Conceptual Genealogy</title>
    <description><![CDATA[
        This is an introduction to an edited volume, Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property (Zone Press, 2010. It's aim is to describe and analyze the conceptual stakes of the new mobilization around A2K. A2K groups contest the terrain of intellectual property law (for example, around issues of access to medicines, free software, farmers' rights to seeds, and free culture) - but what do they have in common? The chapter elaborates on concepts that A2K thinkers use - such as the commons, openness, and access - to challenge the conventional justification for strong intellectual property law. It closes by posing a series of theoretical questions for the movement, like, what is the nature of the freedom that A2K demands? 
    ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/11600.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Sat, 05 Feb 2011 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Harmonization and its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India's Pharmaceutical Sector </title>
    <description><![CDATA[In 2005, India amended its patent law to provide product patents on medicines, to comply with the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement. In order to mitigate the impact on access to medicines, India at the same time adopted an expansive menu of flexibilities in its patent law. Reviewing these important flexibilities, some of which are entirely novel, this article argues that at a formal level TRIPS leaves developing countries far more policy space than is commonly recognized. But while TRIPS as a formal matter cannot produce deep harmonization, it nonetheless channels a strong harmonizing force, because it inserts countries into a transnational circuit that fills in the gaps in the Agreement and that works against the use of TRIPS flexibilities. Limits on administrative resources, the influence of transnational legal networks, and the threat of unilateral retaliation from high-protection jurisdictions all make it difficult for countries like India to implement an autonomous vision of patent law.
<P>The paper also identifies compensating strategies that may facilitate the effective use of TRIPS flexibilities, responding to the transnationalized pressures that TRIPS implementation sets up. I call these strategies fragmentation, mimicry, and counter-harmonization. As I demonstrate, counter-harmonization shows the most promise for developing countries, because it offers countries safety in numbers, can lower the administrative costs of implementing an alternative patent law, and can generate a transnational legal counterculture.</P>
<P>Lastly, the paper engages with the literature about the implications of the legalization of the global trading regime. The case study offered here suggests that legalization cannot simply be identified, as some prominent trade law scholars have argued, with the substitution of politics for principle, and with the leveling of power differences between states. It also suggests a new perspective on the debate over whether the WTO has a “constitutional” form, and if so, what this means. To date, those who claim a constitutional nature for the WTO have identified that nature with a move beyond politics. The analysis offered here suggests that if the WTO has a constitutional nature, it lies in its capacity to mobilize and channel, rather than to suppress or transcend, political disagreement. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10048.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>The Story of the TAC Case: The Potential and Limits of Socio-Economic Rights Litigation in South Africa </title>
    <description><![CDATA[This paper tells the story of the South African constitutional case of Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign. The case is a celebrated example of successful socio-economic rights litigation because it resulted in a direct order to the government to implement a new health care program - specifically, comprehensive program to prevent mother-to-child-transmission of HIV.
<P>Commentators have noted the unusual strength of the court's order in this case, often attributing it to the fact that TAC was an "easy case." We show that the case was only easy because the Treatment Action Campaign spent years laying the groundwork for its legal success. Moreover, the court's order has largely depended on the Treatment Action Campaign for its implementation, such that its true promise still waits to be redeemed. The story of the TAC case thus exemplifies the importance of social movement organization and mobilization to constitutional litigation and constitutional meaning. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10049.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2009 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations </title>
    <description><![CDATA[The article describes the current crisis in access to medicines in the developing world, the existing R&amp;D gap, and the role of universities and other public sector research institutions in exacerbating or ameliorating these problems. It proposes that public sector institutions adopt "Equitable Access Licensing" in order to ensure that patients in low and middle income countries have maximum access to medical technologies originating in universities. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10051.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 03 Feb 2009 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Intellectual property law was once an arcane subject. Today it is at the center of some of the most highly charged political contests of our time. In recent years, college students, subsistence farmers, AIDS activists, genomic scientists, and free-software programmers have mobilized to challenge the contours of intellectual property (IP) law. Very recently, some from these groups have begun to develop a shared critique under the umbrella of "access to knowledge" (A2K). Existing accounts of the political economy of the field of IP have suggested that such a mobilization was unlikely. This Article takes the emergence of the A2K mobilization as an opportunity to develop a richer and less deterministic account of the contemporary politics of IP. It draws upon "frame mobilization" literature, which illuminates the role that acts of interpretation play in instigating, promoting, and legitimating collective action.
<P>The frame-analytic perspective teaches that before a group can act it must develop an account of its interests and theorize how to advance these interests. These acts of interpretation are both socially mediated and contingent. Ideas can be a resource for those engaged in mobilization, but one that is not fully in their control. Frames thus can lay the scaffolding for a countermovement even as they pave the way for a movement's success. Law is a key location for framing conflicts because it provides groups with symbolic resources for framing, and because groups struggle within the field of law to gain control over law's normative and instrumental benefits. Law thus exerts a gravitational pull on framing processes. Engagement with law can influence a group's architecture, discourse, and strategies, and can also create areas of overlapping agreement and - as importantly - a language of common disagreement between opposing groups.</P>
<P>The Article closes by suggesting some implications of this point, which should be of interest to those who design legal institutions and who engage in social mobilization. Most intriguing, perhaps, is the role it suggests that law may play in the creation of global publics and polities. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10050.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2009 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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