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<title>Law and Tech Research feed - Digital Copyright</title>
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    <title>Can Online Piracy Be Stopped by Laws? </title>
    <description><![CDATA[
        This article will explain the key features of SOPA, why the entertainment industry believed SOPA was necessary to combat online piracy, and why SOPA came to be perceived as so flawed that numerous sponsors withdrew their support from the bill. 
    ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/14566.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Sat, 07 Jul 2012 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Jumping the Grooveshark: A Case Study in DMCA Safe Harbor Abuse </title>
    <description><![CDATA[This commentary examines the controversy over Grooveshark, an on-demand music streaming service that has provided access to much of the catalogs of the major record labels without licenses from three of the four majors. It raises questions about how such reliable access could have been sustained under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's notice and take-down regime and highlights real problems plaguing legitimate commerce in the digital music marketplace. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/12763.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Wed, 21 Dec 2011 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Prior to the emergence of peer-to-peer technology, the Copyright Act’s distribution right was largely dormant. Most enforcement actions were premised upon violations of the reproduction right. The relatively few cases invoking the distribution right involved arcane scenarios. During the past several years, direct enforcement of the Copyright Act against file sharers has brought the scope of the distribution right to center stage. Whereas the 1909 Act expressly protected the rights to “publish” and “vend,” the 1976 Act speaks of a right to “distribute.” Interpreting “distribute” narrowly, some courts have held that copyright owners must prove that a sound recording placed in a peer-to-peer share folder was actually downloaded to establish violation of the distribution right. Other courts hold that merely making a sound recording available violates the distribution right. The ramifications for copyright enforcement in the Internet age are substantial. Under the narrow interpretation, the relative anonymity of peer-to-peer transmissions in combination with privacy concerns make enforcement costly and difficult. A broad interpretation exposes millions of peer-to-peer users to potentially crushing statutory damages.
<P>Drawing upon the historical development of copyright law and the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976, this article explains why Congress selected the term “distribute” in its last omnibus revision of copyright law, shows unequivocally that Congress intended to encompass broadly the 1909 Act rights to “publish” and “vend” within the right to distribute, and rejects the position that Congress required proof of “actual distribution” to prove violation of the distribution right. This critical legislative history has been notably absent from treatise accounts and briefing on the liability standard in the file sharing cases, leaving courts without a compass to navigate this statutory terrain. This article traces the origins of the key legislative terms to elucidate the scope of the distribution right in the Internet age. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/9913.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 14 Dec 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Digital Exhaustion </title>
    <description><![CDATA[As digital networks emerge as the dominant means of distributing copyrighted works, the first sale doctrine is increasingly marginalized. The limitations first sale places on the exclusive right of distribution are of little importance when the alienation and use of copies entails their reproduction. This fact of the modern copyright marketplace has led to calls for statutory clarification of digital first sale rights.
<P>Acknowledging the obstacles to legislative intervention, this Article argues that courts are equipped today to limit copyright exclusivity in order to enable copy owners to make traditionally lawful uses of their copies, including resale through secondary markets. We argue that first sale is not simply an isolated limitation on the distribution right. Instead, it is a component of a broader principle of copyright exhaustion that emerges from early case law preceding the Supreme Court’s foundational decision in Bobbs-Merrill v. Strauss. This context reveals a common law of copyright exhaustion that embraces a set of user privileges that includes not only alienation, but renewal, repair, adaptation, and preservation. Despite congressional recognition of exhaustion in sections 109 and 117 of the Copyright Act, this Article concludes that courts have ample room to apply and continue to develop common law rules that preserve the many benefits of the first sale doctrine in the digital marketplace. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10045.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Sat, 16 Oct 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>The Google Book Settlement as Copyright Reform </title>
    <description><![CDATA[An intriguing way to view the proposed settlement of the copyright litigation over the Google Book Search (GBS) Project is as a mechanism through which to achieve copyright reform that Congress has not yet and may never be willing to do. The settlement would, in effect, give Google a compulsory license to commercialize millions of out-of-print books, including those that are “orphans” (that is, books whose rights holders cannot readily be located), establish a revenue-sharing arrangement as to these books, authorize the creation of an institutional subscription database that would be licensed to libraries and other entities, resolve disputes between authors and publishers over who owns copyrights in electronic versions of their books, provide a safe harbor for Google for any mistakes it might make in good faith as to whether books are in the public domain or in-copyright, and immunize libraries from secondary liability for providing books to Google for GBS, among other things.
<P>This Article explains why certain features of U.S. law, particularly copyright law, may have contributed to Google’s willingness to undertake the GBS project in the first place and later to its motivation to settle the Authors Guild lawsuit. It then demonstrates that the proposed settlement would indeed achieve a measure of copyright reform that Congress would find difficult to accomplish. Some of this reform may be in the public interest. It also considers whether the quasi-legislative nature of the GBS settlement is merely an interesting side effect of the agreement or an additional reason in favor or against approval of this settlement. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10039.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 28 Sep 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Updating Fair Use for Innovators and Creators in the Digital Age: Two Targeted Reforms</title>
    <description><![CDATA[In Parts I, II, and III of this first installment of our Report series, we discuss the critical role fair use plays in copyright’s balance between granting exclusive rights to creators and ensuring public benefits; how fair use has changed over time in order to accommodate new technologies and social changes; and where its limitations create roadblocks to innovation and creativity. In Part IV, we propose two limited reforms, (attached hereto as Appendix A):
<P>• Updating Section 107 to provide better guidance to courts, creators, copyright holders, and innovators on how to interpret the statute in light of new technologies and new forms of art and media by adding a limited (and nonexclusive) set of additional uses to its preamble; and</P>
<P>• Reforming Sections 504 and 505 to reduce one of the greatest barriers to making fair use of copyrighted works: fears of excessive and unpredictable statutory damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. The unpredictability of these remedies can chill even the most intrepid follow-on users making the most conservative fair uses.</P>
<P>These reforms are limited in scope and general in application for an important reason: one of the great strengths of the American fair use doctrine is its flexibility in accommodating both new uses and new markets for copyright holders. This ability to adapt and change as needed to preserve copyright’s critical balance over time has been a hallmark of good copyright policy. As such, in many aspects it is most appropriate for<BR>fair use to develop through court cases and community norms,2 which can flexibly take into account changes in technology, societal and community practices, and business models.</P>
<P>At the same time, fair use is frequently criticized for the tradeoff required by such flexibility: unpredictability.3 Because it can sometimes be difficult to predict with certainty whether a court will find a given use fair, and because the downside risk of high statutory damages, costs and fees is also unpredictable, follow-on creators can be prevented from making and distributing valuable works that rely on fair use.</P>
<P>There is no model that can completely remove unpredictability from a flexible system, though proper understanding of caselaw4 and community norms5 can help. This Report focuses on another important method for increasing predictability without unduly sacrificing flexibility: Congress can update the general Section 107 framework with targeted changes that promote consistency across jurisdictions, diminish key chilling effects on fair use, and increase efficiency by limiting the need for litigation, without putting in place specific parameters that might limit the flexibility of the doctrine over time. We have focused our suggested reforms on Congress’ ability to achieve these goals. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10324.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Sat, 13 Feb 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Copyright initially developed in response to the printing press and gradually evolved to encompass other methods of mechanically storing and reproducing works of authorship, such as photography, motion pictures, and sound recordings. The advent of broadcasting - the ability to perform works at distant points - led to the expansion of copyright to encompass exploitation of creative expression in new markets. The digital revolution represents a third distinct wave of technological innovation that portends significant changes in copyright protection. By bringing about new modes of expression (such as computer programming and digital sampling of music) and empowering anyone with a computer and an Internet connection to flawlessly, inexpensively, and instantaneously reproduce and distribute works of authorship on a wide scale, digital technology represents possibly the most profound challenge to copyright law. This article divides the analysis of digital technology into two categories: (1) squeezing computer software within copyright's non-functionally oriented protection regime and (2) developing new rules and governance institutions to address the ease of reproduction and porosity of the digital platform. Part I of the article traces the two decades of evolution of copyright protection for computer software and demonstrates that copyright law has proven quite adaptable to this hybrid of expressive and utilitarian creativity. The courts have enabled copyright law to serve effectively as an anti-piracy regime without allowing it to intrude unduly into patent law's domain. This holding of the line has in fact moved the battles over legal protection for software into the patent and contract realms. Part II explores the implications of digital distribution of content for copyright's future. Content industries perceive grave threats to their continued existence (and the production of creative works) while technology companies and a growing array of consumer, programmer, and civil liberty organizations fear that further expansion of copyright protection jeopardizes technological innovation and basic civil liberties. A growing cadre of legal academics predict copyrights ultimate demise. As a basis for assessing these claims and understanding the implications of this new and rapidly improving digital platform, this article examines the technological changes taking place, industry structures, the legal environment, and the evolving social and political landscape. Although these forces remain in flux, the digital revolution can be seen increasingly to shift resources and pressure for reform toward copyright enforcement, standard setting (in an effort to develop effective controls on content distribution), antitrust regulation of standard setting processes, and a more general transformation of copyright law from a property rights orientation toward a regulatory regime. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10329.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2009 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>What Effects Do Legal Rules Have on Service Innovation? </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Intellectual property, contract, and tort laws likely have effects on levels of innovation in service sectors of the economy. Legal rules that are too strong or too strict may discourage investment in service innovation; yet, rules that are too weak or too loose may result in suboptimal investments in sound innovation. Intellectual property protections have traditionally been quite strong in protecting innovation in manufacturing sectors, but much less so in service sectors. Services have, for example, traditionally been unpatentable because they were perceived to be non-technological. Whether digital information services, such as web services, should be patentable is currently unsettled and highly controversial. Contract and tort rules are currently quite strict as to manufactured goods, but less so as to services. The emergence of digital information services raises questions about whether existing contract and tort rules governing goods or services should be applied to them, or whether some new legal rules are needed to promote innovation in digital information services and social welfare more generally. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10417.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2009 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Efficient Process or &quot;Chilling Effects&quot;? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act</title>
    <description><![CDATA[Digital Millennium Copyright Act, created a process that was intended to help copyright owners ensure rapid removal of allegedly infringing material from the Internet while guaranteeing compliant OSPs a safe harbor from liability for Internet users’ acts of copyright infringement. The U.S. copyright industry thus gained a new tool to combat the loss of billions of dollars (U.S.) annually from copyright infringement; OSPs, concerned about the direction of court decisions concerning their liability for their users’ copyright infringement, received protection from potential secondary liability. To qualify, OSPs must “accommodate” technical protection measures employed by copyright holders and implement policies for terminating the accounts of repeat infringers.Further measures are also required of OSPs in some situations, including the takedown of online material in response to a copyright-holder notice—the subject of this Article.

<P>In negotiating the &sect; 512 compromise, copyright holders sought to ensure that OSPs had incentives to remove infringing material, and OSPs sought to avoid lawsuits and judgments based on secondary liability for users’ acts of copyright infringement. The resulting &sect; 512 safe harbor is granted to OSPs in exchange for the “expeditious” takedown, upon notice by the copyright holder, of allegedly infringing material. The alleged infringers are to be protected from mistaken takedowns and misuse of this rather remarkable extra-judicial process principally through a counternotice procedure, through which they can demand replacement of the material if the copyright owner fails to initiate a lawsuit.</P>

<P>Copyright-holders have had access to the easy-to-initiate takedown process afforded by 17 U.S.C. &sect; 512 for nearly eight years, and a review of the law seems in order. Has this compromise between industries worked as planned? Has infringing material been removed from the Internet? How have Internet publishers fared, including businesses large and small, bloggers, critics, and the many other speakers who make use of the Internet? How, if at all, has the great democratization of expression afforded by the Internet been affected by a simple, expedient extra-judicial procedure for removing material? These questions are frustratingly difficult to answer, a difficulty exacerbated by the fact that &sect; 512 takedown notices—a matter of private action like any other cease-and-desist letter—are not part of the public record.</P>

<P>But for nearly four years, the Chilling Effects project has attempted to fill some of the gaps in this knowledge by collecting and archiving cease-and-desist notices of all kinds. Chilling Effects has collected &sect; 512 takedown notices from a variety of sources, including all notices received by Google Inc. For this Article, we analyzed nearly 900 of these notices along various axes in an attempt to begin answering some of these questions. Our research is ongoing, and presumably over time the data set will increase in depth and size. As such, this is a preliminary evaluation. Insofar as we have begun to answer some questions, we have also learned enough to raise more questions and establish directions for further research. Unfortunately, however, our findings comprise a rather negative snapshot of the ways in which the &sect; 512 process is being used, and reveal little benefit to some of the constituencies it was intended to support.</P>

<P>In Part II of this Article, we explain the &sect; 512 process. In Part III, we sketch the rationale and history behind &sect; 512, and briefly note some of the predictions, hopes and concerns that &sect; 512 inspired in industry players, policymakers and commentators. In Parts IV, V, and VI, we present our study of &sect; 512 notices, including a description of the data set, our methodology and findings. In Part VII, we analyze the findings and make some suggestions for change to the safe harbor scheme set up by &sect; 512.<A href="/files/bclt_Urban_Fair_Use_Report.pdf"></A></P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10325.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 23 May 2006 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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