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<title>Law and Tech Research feed - Consumer Protection</title>
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<link>http://law.berkeley.edu</link>
<lastBuildDate> 11:12:55 -0400 </lastBuildDate>
<pubDate> 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>


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    <title>Mobile Payments: Consumer Benefits &amp; New Privacy Concerns</title>
    <description><![CDATA[
        Payment systems that allow people to pay using their mobile phones are promised to reduce transaction fees, increase convenience, and enhance payment security. New mobile payment systems also are likely to make it easier for businesses to identify consumers, to collect more information about consumers, and to share more information about consumers’ purchases among more businesses. While many studies have reported security concerns as a barrier to adoption of mobile payment technologies, the privacy implications of these technologies have been under examined. To better understand Americans’ attitudes towards privacy in new transaction systems, we commissioned a nationwide, telephonic (wireline and wireless) survey of 1,200 households, focusing upon the ways that mobile payment systems are likely to share information about consumers’ purchases.<br />
        <br />
        We found that Americans overwhelmingly oppose the revelation of contact information (phone number, email address, and home address) to merchants when making purchases with mobile payment systems. Furthermore, an even higher level of opposition exists to systems that track consumers’ movements through their mobile phones.<br />
        <br />
        We explain some advantages of mobile payment systems, some challenges to their adoption in the United States, and then turn to our main finding: Americans overwhelming reject mobile payment systems that track their movements or share identification information with retailers. We then suggest a possible remedy for such information sharing: adapting provisions of California’s Song-Beverly Credit Card Act, which prohibits merchants from requesting personal information at the register when a consumer pays with a credit card, to mobile payments systems. Our survey results suggest that consumers would support limitations on information collection and transfer. Song-Beverly could be adopted to accommodate those who wish to share their transaction data. <br />
        
    ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/13351.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 24 Apr 2012 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Internalizing Identity Theft</title>
    <description><![CDATA[Why has identity theft remained so prevalent, in light of the development of ever more sophisticated fraud detection tools? Identity theft remains at 2003 levels – 9.9 million Americans fell victim to the crime in 2009.
<P>One faction explains the identity theft as a problem of a lack of control over personal information. Another argues conversely that identity theft may be caused by a lack of access to personal information by credit grantors. This article presents data from a small sample of identity theft victims to explore a different dimension of the crime, one that suggests alternative interventions.</P>
<P>Drawing upon victim and impostor data now accessible because of updates to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the data show that identity theft impostors supply obviously erroneous information on applications that is accepted as valid by credit grantors. Thus, the problem does not necessarily lie in control nor in more availability of personal information, but rather in the risk tolerances of credit grantors. An analysis of incentives in credit granting elucidates the problem: identity theft remains so prevalent because it is less costly to tolerate fraud. Adopting more aggressive and expensive anti-fraud measures is extremely costly and jeopardizes customer acquisition efforts.</P>
<P>These business decisions leave individuals and merchants with some of the externalities of identity theft. Victims sometimes spend their own money, and more often, valuable personal time dealing with identity theft externalities. This article concludes by reviewing several approaches to internalizing these costs. Popular approaches specify prescriptive rules to address particularly problematic practices in credit granting, such as using the Social Security number as a password for authentication. These approaches may lead to compliance-oriented approaches and reification. Several commentators have suggested negligence actions as a cure to identity theft, but uncertainty surrounding the duty of care would probably leave many consumers unremunerated. A strict liability regime is suggested because credit grantors are the least cost avoiders in the identity theft context, and because consumers cannot control the credit granting process nor insure against identity theft losses efficiently. </P>
<P><EM>UCLA Journal of Law and Technology</EM>, p. 1, 2010 </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/9996.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Wed, 15 Dec 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>How Different are Young Adults from Older Adults When it Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Study by:
<P><STRONG>Chris Jay Hoofnagle<BR></STRONG>University of California, Berkeley - School of Law, Berkeley Center for Law &amp; Technology</P>
<P><STRONG>Jennifer King<BR></STRONG>UC Berkeley School of Information; Berkeley Center for Law &amp; Technology</P>
<P><STRONG>Su Li<BR></STRONG>University of California, Berkeley- School of Law, Center for the Study of Law and Society</P>
<P><STRONG>Joseph Turow<BR></STRONG>University of Pennsylvania - Annenberg School for Communication<BR></P>
<P>Media reports teem with stories of young people posting salacious photos online, writing about alcohol-fueled misdeeds on social networking sites, and publicizing other ill-considered escapades that may haunt them in the future. These anecdotes are interpreted as representing a generation-wide shift in attitude toward information privacy. Many commentators therefore claim that young people “are less concerned with maintaining privacy than older people are.” Surprisingly, though, few empirical investigations have explored the privacy attitudes of young adults. This report is among the first quantitative studies evaluating young adults’ attitudes. It demonstrates that the picture is more nuanced than portrayed in the popular media.</P>
<P>In this telephonic (wireline and wireless) survey of internet using Americans (N=1000), we found that large percentages of young adults (those 18-24 years) are in harmony with older Americans regarding concerns about online privacy, norms, and policy suggestions. In several cases, there are no statistically significant differences between young adults and older age categories on these topics. Where there were differences, over half of the young adult-respondents did answer in the direction of older adults. There clearly is social significance in that large numbers of young adults agree with older Americans on issues of information privacy.</P>
<P>A gap in privacy knowledge provides one explanation for the apparent license with which the young behave online. 42 percent of young Americans answered all of our five online privacy questions incorrectly. 88 percent answered only two or fewer correctly. The problem is even more pronounced when presented with offline privacy issues – post hoc analysis showed that young Americans were more likely to answer no questions correctly than any other age group.</P>
<P>We conclude then that that young-adult Americans have an aspiration for increased privacy even while they participate in an online reality that is optimized to increase their revelation of personal data. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/9994.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Sat, 17 Apr 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Should Copyright Owners Have to Give Notice about Their Use of Technical Protection Measures? </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Consumers expect to be able to do at least as much with digital content as they have been able to do with analog content, and more. Yet, some copyright owners are using technical protection measures to thwart certain consumer uses of digital content, and rarely do they give effective notice to consumers about these technical restrictions. This article identifies six types of consumer harms that have occurred from inadequate notice, including lack of expected interoperability, privacy invasions, security vulnerabilities, anti-competitive lock-out as to compatible systems, risks of inadvertent anti-circumvention liability, and unanticipated changing terms and discontinued service. It discusses a range of options for responding to the notice inadequacy problem, from trusting the market to substantive regulation that would forbid use of certain kinds of TPM restrictions (such as those that invade user privacy). Because the market has yet to yield effective notice to consumers of TPM restrictions, the article recommends that the Federal Trade Commission investigate the deployment of TPMs in digital content and make recommendations for standard notices that should be provided to consumers about the TPM restrictions. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10046.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 20 Dec 2007 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Regulating 'Spyware': The Limitations of State 'Laboratories' and the Case for Federal Preemption of State Unfair Competition Laws </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Drawing on Justice Brandeis's oft-cited observation that states can serve as "laboratories" of policy experimentation, this Article develops a framework for assessing the allocation of governance authority for regulating Internet activities. In particular, it focuses on whether states should be free to experiment with regulatory approaches or whether the federal government should have principal, if not exclusive (preemptive), regulatory authority over Internet-related activities. Using recent efforts to regulate spyware and adware as a case study, the analysis shows that the lack of harmonization of, and uncertainty surrounding, state unfair competition law produces costly, confusing, multi-district litigation and pushes enterprises to adhere to the limits of the most restrictive state. Such a governance regime unduly hinders innovation in Internet business models. On this basis, the Article favors a uniform federal regulatory system and pre-emption of state statutes and unfair competition common law as applied to spyware and adware. The final section of the Article extrapolates from this study of spyware and adware regulation to the larger context of Internet governance. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10344.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2005 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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