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    <title>New Governance, Chief Privacy Officers, and the Corporate Management of Information Privacy in the United States: An Initial Inquiry</title>
    <description><![CDATA[
        While the turn from traditional regulation to more collaborative, experimentalist, and flexible forms of governance has garnered significant academic focus, far less attention has been paid to the effects of such “new governance” approaches on regulated firms' understanding of the laws' demands, and on the structures employed within business organizations to meet them. This article targets this analytic gap by examining internal corporate practices regarding consumer privacy, an arena in which the Federal Trade Commission and the states have adopted new governance models. Using data from qualitative interviews with leading corporate Chief Privacy Officers, as well as internal corporate documentation, it examines the way privacy practices have been catalyzed in the shadow of new privacy governance approaches and the combination of regulatory, market, and stakeholder forces they seek to harness. Specifically, it suggests the convergence of a set of practices adopted by privacy officers identified as “leaders,” regarding both high‐level corporate privacy management and the integration of privacy into entity‐wide risk management goals through technology, decision‐making processes, and the empowerment of distributed expertise networks throughout the firm. 
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    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/12072.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Wed, 21 Sep 2011 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Catalyzing Privacy: New Governance, Information Practices, and the Business Organization </title>
    <description><![CDATA[While the turn from traditional regulation to more collaborative, experimentalist, and flexible forms of governance has garnered significant academic focus, far less attention has been paid to the effects of such “New Governance” approaches on regulated firms’ understanding of the laws’ demands, and on the structures employed within business organizations to meet them. This article targets this analytic gap by examining internal corporate practices regarding consumer privacy, an arena in which the Federal Trade Commission and the States have adopted new governance models. Using data from qualitative interviews with leading corporate Chief Privacy Officers, as well as internal corporate documentation, it examines the way privacy practices have been catalyzed in the shadow of new privacy governance approaches, and the combination of regulatory, market and stakeholder forces they seek to harness. Specifically, it suggests the convergence of a set of practices adopted by privacy officers identified as “leaders,” both regarding high-level corporate privacy management, and regarding the integration of privacy into entity-wide risk management goals through technology, decisionmaking processes, and the empowerment of distributed expertise networks throughout the firm. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10060.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 02 Nov 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Privacy on the Books and on the Ground </title>
    <description><![CDATA[U.S. privacy law is under attack. Scholars and advocates criticize it as weak, incomplete, and confusing, and argue that it fails to empower individuals to control the use of their personal information. These critiques present a largely accurate description of the law “on the books.” But the debate has strangely ignored privacy “on the ground” — since 1994, no one has conducted a sustained inquiry into how corporations actually manage privacy, and what motivates them.
<P>This Article presents findings from the first study of corporate privacy management in fifteen years, involving qualitative interviews with Chief Privacy Officers identified by their peers as industry leaders. Spurred by these findings, we present a descriptive account of privacy “on the ground” that upends the terms of the prevailing policy debate. This alternative account identifies elements neglected by the traditional story — the emergence of the Federal Trade Commission as a privacy regulator, the increasing influence of privacy advocates, market and media pressures for privacy-protection, and the rise of privacy professionals — and traces the ways in which these players supplemented a privacy debate largely focused on processes (such as notice and consent mechanisms) with a growing emphasis on substance: preventing violations of consumers’ expectations of privacy.</P>
<P>This “grounded” account should inform privacy reforms. While widespread efforts to expand consent mechanisms to empower individuals to control their personal information may offer some promise, those efforts should not proceed in a way that eclipses robust substantive definitions of privacy and the protections they are beginning to produce, or that constrains the regulatory flexibility that permits their evolution. This would destroy important tools for limiting corporate over-reaching, curbing consumer manipulation, and protecting shared expectations about the personal sphere on the Internet, and in the marketplace. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10061.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Mon, 18 Oct 2010 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Privacy Decisionmaking in Administrative Agencies </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Administrative agencies increasingly rely on technology to achieve substantive goals. Often this technology is employed to collect, exchange, manipulate and store personally identifiable information, raising serious concerns about the erosion of personal privacy.
<P>Congress has recognized this problem. In the E-Government Act of 2002, it required administrative agencies to conduct privacy impact assessments (PIAs) when developing or procuring technology systems that handle personal information. Despite this new requirement, however, agency adherence to privacy mandates is highly inconsistent.</P>
<P>In this paper, we ask why. We first explore why both process requirements and traditional means of political oversight are often weak tools for ensuring that policy reflects privacy commitments. We then consider what factors might, by contrast, promote agency consideration of privacy concerns.</P>
<P>Specifically, we compare decisions by two federal agencies - the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security - to use RFID technology, which allows a wireless-access data chip to be attached to or inserted into a product, animal, or person. These two cases suggest the importance of internal agency structure, culture, and personnel, as well as alternative forms of external oversight, interest group engagement, and professional expertise, as important mechanisms for ensuring bureaucratic accountability to the secondary privacy mandate imposed by Congress.</P>
<P>The analysis speaks to debates in both public administration and privacy protection. It implicates disputes over the efficacy of external controls on bureaucracy, and the less-developed literature on opening the black box of administrative decisionmaking. It further offers insight into pre-conditions necessary to advance privacy commitments in the face of social and bureaucratic pressure to manage risk by collecting information about individuals. Finally, it offers specific proposals for policy reform intended to promote agency accountability to privacy goals. </P>]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10137.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 13 Mar 2008 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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