As networked computing devices become both more pervasive and more central to infrastructure and daily life, the potential for harm to result from security failures is increasing rapidly. Already, successful attacks have crippled large networks and exposed personal and financial information to misuse. But networks are beginning to connect far more than computers and cell phones; automobiles, building materials, and home appliances are getting ready to go online. At the same time, adversaries have become highly skilled, efficiently organized, and motivated by financial or even political gain.
This dynamic of greater connectivity, escalating reliance on networked systems, and the gains to be made from attacking these systems has made security a critical technical and policy issue. In particular, making systems more secure can put other values — privacy and functionality, for example — at risk. With funding from the NSF-funded Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure Technologies (TRUST) and from the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P), the Samuelson Clinic is investigating how technology and policy interact in the realms of research, the government, and the marketplace.
|Samuelson Clinic Submitted Comments to the California Public Utilities Commission on Privacy and the "Smart Grid" on behalf of the Center for Democracy & Technology ||2010||Clinical Project, Comments|
|New Study Recommends Reforms for Security Breach Notification Laws||2007||Research Paper|
|User Choices and Regret: Understanding Users' Decision Process about Consensually Acquired Spyware||2006||Research Paper|
|Samuelson Clinic Submitted Comment to U.S. Copyright Office on behalf of Edward Felten and J. Alex Halderman||2005||Comments|
|Samuelson Clinic Released Paper on Legal, Technical, and Software Interface Design Issues Related to Spyware||2005||Research Paper, Presentation|
|Stopping Spyware at the Gate: A User Study of Privacy, Notice and Spyware||2005||Research Paper|
|Enforcing Privacy Rights Symposium 2002||2003||Research Paper|
|Threat Analysis of the geopriv Protocol, co-authored with M. Danley, J. Morris, and J. Peterson, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Internet-Drafts, The Internet Society||2003||Research Paper|
|IDs - Not That Easy: Questions About Nationwide Identity Systems||2002||Report|
|geopriv Requirements, co-authored with Jorge Cuellar, John B. Morris, Jr., Jon Peterson, and James Polk, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Internet-Drafts, The Internet Society||2001||Research Paper|