The BCLT Annual Privacy Lecture

October 6, 2014
Booth Auditorium, Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA

Presented by Professor Ross Anderson with responses by Carl Shapiro, James Aquilina, and Anupam Chander. Moderated by Paul Schwartz, Professor at the UC Berkeley School of Law.

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February 28, 2013
Bancroft Hotel
Berkeley, CA

Presented by Professor Joel Reidenberg with responses by Kurt Wimmer and Professor Anu Bradford. Moderated by Professor Paul Schwartz.

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March 19, 2012
Bancroft Hotel
Berkeley, CA

Presented by Dr. Susan Landau with responses from Dr. Rolf H. Weber and Dr. Felix Wu. Moderated by Professor Paul Schwartz.

Designers of the first electronic telephone switches nicknamed them the "large immortal machines" because switches last decades.  The 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) requires that all digital-switched telephone networks be built wiretap enabled; the law took longevity of switches into account by authorizing funding to update switches in place.  But by failing to analyze how threat models would change in a highly connected IP-based world, CALEA did not consider the longevity of switches prospectively.  As an architected security breach, CALEA compliance is a ticking time bomb.  Alleviating this was the subject of this talk.

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The 4th Annual BCLT Privacy Lecture: Standardizing Privacy Notices: Privacy Taxonomy, Privacy Nutrition Labels, and Computer-Readable Policies


February 17, 2011
Bancroft Hotel
Berkeley, CA

Presented by Dr. Lorrie Cranor with responses from Dr. Thomas Fetzer and Dr. Jennifer Gove. Moderated by Professor Paul Schwartz.

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The 3rd Annual BCLT Privacy Lecture: Privacy - An Endless Debate?

April 5, 2010
Bancroft Hotel
Berkeley, CA

In this lecture, Professor Spiros Simitis discussed the famous article by William Prosser, Privacy, which appeared in the California Law Review fifty years ago. He identified the comparable approaches in other legal systems, and especially in German law. He also described and analyzed the gradual replacement of traditional privacy approaches by modern information privacy statutes, which are termed "data protection laws." He concluded with a depiction of the increasingly awkward situation of privacy against the background of a constantly expanding Internet. Professor Spiros Simitis is the father of modern European information privacy law. Through his scholarship, policy entrepreneurship, and political engagement, he has played a uniquely significant role in shaping major European regulation in the area of privacy.

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March 18, 2009
Bancroft Hotel
Berkeley, CA

It is easy to fall into the trap of assuming that legal systems typically resolve dyadic relationships in which a plaintiff seeks to gain something from a defendant. But in the many social settings the operative arrangements involve three or more parties, and the question is how to sort out the arrangements among them. These questions can arise in private law, for example, when one person lends property to a third person for safekeeping. These three cornered problems have generated interesting legal solutions under the law of bailments when property has been destroyed by a third person. More close to home, there is a long line of cases that addresses the question of whether the bailee of tangible property is in a position to claim any privilege of his bailor when that property is sought by government investigators. The mode of search and request may change as we move from tangible documents to cyberspace, but the principle of analysis says the same. Professor Epstein argued that privileges against government intrusion into information are these same in all settings and that the owner of property should not be required to forfeit protection when that information is transferred to third parties.

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April 14, 2008
Bancroft Hotel
Berkeley, CA

In the first two years after 9/11, U.S. authorities detained over 5,000 foreign nationals in anti-terrorism preventive detention measures. Today, all have been released, and not one stands convicted of a terrorist offense. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, authorities rounded up far fewer suspects in the wake of September 11 or their own terrorist subway and bus bombings on July 7, 2005. At the same time, privacy protections in the UK appear to be substantially less robust than in the United States, as a matter of law and practice. Closed-circuit television cameras are ubiquitous, the police have been authorized to make suspicionless stop-and-frisks throughout London since 9/11, and wiretapping is subject to far less oversight than in the US. We often talk about the balance between liberty and security, but this comparison suggests that there may also be significant trade-offs between liberties. The less a government knows about where threats lie, the more likely it may be to conduct expansive sweeps and preventive detention in the face of a security threat. A comparison of the UK and US response to terrorism suggests that trade-offs between rights may themselves be as fraught, and as significant, as the trade-offs between rights and security.

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